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Abstract 
What are the effects of the WTO’s TRIPS Agreement on growth, welfare and income inequality? 
To analyze this question, we develop an open-economy R&D-growth model with wealth heterogeneity. 
Under TRIPS, the North experiences higher growth and welfare at the expense of higher income 
inequality. As for the South, it experiences higher growth at the expense of lower welfare and higher 
income inequality. There exists a critical degree for the domestic importance of foreign goods below 
(above) which global welfare decreases (increases) under TRIPS. In light of our findings, we discuss 
policy implications on China’s accession to the WTO in 2001.  
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1. Introduction 
The WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), initiated in the 
1986-94 Uruguay Round, establishes a minimum level of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection that 
must be provided by each member country. Given that developed countries (i.e. the North) generally have 
a higher level of IPR protection than developing countries (i.e. the South), the TRIPS agreement is likely 
to have asymmetric effects on the North and the South. As an example of the North (South), we consider 
the US (China). Table 1 presents Park’s (2008) index of patent rights in the US and China.1 
Year 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
China 1.33 1.33 2.12 3.09 4.08
United States 4.68 4.68 4.88 4.88 4.88
Table 1: Index of Patent Rights from Park (2008)
 
Table 1 shows that as a result of TRIPS, the level of patent protection in China is converging towards the 
level in the US.2 Given the importance of TRIPS, what are its effects on economic growth, social welfare 
and income inequality?  
To analyze this question, we develop an open-economy quality-ladder model with heterogeneity 
in the wealth of households. In the model, both the North and the South invest in R&D, but the North is 
assumed to have a higher degree of innovative capability than the South. Within this framework, we 
derive the following results. Firstly, an increase in the level of patent protection in either the North or the 
South increases both countries’ (a) economic growth by stimulating R&D investment and (b) income 
inequality by raising the return on assets. Then, following Lai and Qiu (2003) and Grossman and Lai 
(2004), we derive the pre-TRIPS Nash equilibrium level of patent protection. We find that the North 
would set a higher level of patent protection than the South. Imposing the North’s level of patent 
protection on the South as required by TRIPS increases (decreases) social welfare of the North (South).  
                                                 
1 The index is a scale of 0 to 5, and a larger number indicates stronger patent protection. See, Ginarte and Park (1997) 
and Park (2008) for details.  
2 As a result of TRIPS, the statutory term of patent in the US was extended from 17 years (counting from the issue 
date when a patent is granted) to 20 years (counting from the earliest claimed filing date). However, because of the 
difference in the starting date, the effective patent extension was minimal. As for China, it extended the patent 
length from 15 years to 20 years in 1992. Prior to joining the WTO in 2001, China reformed its patent system in 
2000 in compliance with the TRIPS agreement. 
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This welfare implication is consistent with Lai and Qiu (2003) and Grossman and Lai (2004). It is 
perhaps not surprising that the South would be worse off by deviating from its best response. Therefore, 
the intriguing question is whether TRIPS would improve or reduce global welfare. We find that there 
exists a critical degree for the importance of foreign goods in domestic consumption below (above) which 
global welfare is lower (higher) under TRIPS while Lai and Qiu (2003) find that global welfare is always 
higher under TRIPS. This difference arises because we allow for varying degree for the importance of 
foreign goods in domestic consumption. In our model, the degree of positive externality in the Nash 
equilibrium is determined by the domestic importance of foreign goods. When foreign goods are not very 
important for domestic consumption, the two countries are almost in autarky. In this case, imposing the 
North’s level of patent protection on the South makes the South worse off without making the North 
much better off. 
The above finding has important policy implications. Firstly, it implies that the North is not 
always able to compensate the South. Secondly, the condition under which global welfare would increase 
under TRIPS is that foreign goods are sufficiently important for domestic consumption. In other words, a 
sufficient degree of globalization is a necessary condition for the harmonization of IPR protection to 
improve global welfare. This finding rationalizes the fact that TRIPS, which is an international agreement 
on intellectual property issues rather than trade issues, is on the agenda of the WTO, an organization for 
liberalizing trade.  
Finally, our model with heterogeneous households enables us to analyze the effects of TRIPS on 
income inequality in addition to growth and welfare. Under TRIPS, the North experiences higher levels of 
growth and welfare at the expense of higher income inequality. As for the South, it experiences higher 
growth at the expense of lower welfare and higher income inequality. Intuitively, a higher growth rate 
increases the rate of return on assets through the Euler equation, and this higher asset return increases the 
income of asset-wealthy households relative to asset-poor households in each country. On one hand, the 
current study provides a model that highlights the increasing importance of capital income on income 
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inequality.3 On the other hand, our result suggests that the representative-agent welfare analysis of TRIPS 
in previous studies can be robust to an extension with heterogeneous households. However, given the 
effect of TRIPS on income inequality, an analysis without considering the distributional consequences 
within a country may overstate the benefits and understate the costs to the society if income inequality is a 
social concern. 
For example, China amended its patent law in 2000 in anticipation of its accession to the WTO in 
2001.4 Since this amendment, the annual growth rate of the number of applications for invention patents 
in China has increased to 23% (compared to less than 10% before 2000). Hu and Jefferson (2009) provide 
empirical evidence to show that the patent-law amendment in 2000 is a major factor for China’s recent 
surge in patenting activities. Also, R&D as a share of GDP in China increases from an average of about 
0.7% in the 90’s to 1.49% in 2007.5 At the same time, the rising income inequality in China poses the 
country a serious challenge on domestic stability. In 2007, China’s Gini coefficient rises to 0.47 that is 
above the threshold of 0.45 considered by many to indicate potential social unrest. “The United Nations 
Development Programme… warned that the growing income gap between rich and poor in China could 
threaten its stability, saying Beijing should increase social spending, reform the fiscal system and push 
government reforms to narrow the gap.” Our analysis suggests that increasing the level of patent 
protection in China as a result of TRIPS would not only lead to a reduction in China’s social welfare as 
implied by previous studies but also exacerbates its rising income inequality. Given the current situation 
in China, the second consequence seems to be more alarming. In a panel regression, Adams (2008) finds 
that strengthening IPR protection indeed has a positive and statistically significant effect on income 
                                                 
3 Although the prevailing wisdom is that income inequality is mainly caused by an increase in the skill premium (i.e. 
the relative wage between skilled and unskilled workers), some studies, such as Atkinson (2000, 2003), argue that 
inequality in capital income is also playing an increasingly important role. For example, Reed and Cancian (2001) 
show that capital income contributes to one quarter of the increase in income inequality in the US in the 90’s while it 
accounts for less than one-tenth of the increase in the 70’s.  
4 The changes include (a) providing patent holders with the right to obtain a preliminary injunction against the 
infringing party before filing a lawsuit, (b) stipulating standards to compute statutory damages, (c) affirming that 
state and non-state enterprises enjoy equal patent rights, and (d) simplifying the patent application process, 
examination and transfer procedures and unifying the appeal system. 
5 This data can be obtained from China Statistical Yearbook. 
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inequality in developing countries. Using Adams’ (2008) estimates, increasing Park’s (2008) index by 
one point is associated with an increase in the Gini coefficient of 0.01 to 0.02 in developing countries. 
We should emphasize that China’s accession to the WTO carries other benefits, such as lower 
trade barriers, which are not captured in this partial analysis of patent policy. In the model, we introduce a 
parameter to capture trade barriers and find that lower trade barriers improve social welfare. Therefore, a 
complete welfare analysis on China’s accession to the WTO should include both the welfare gain from 
lower trade barriers and the welfare loss from TRIPS. 
 
1.1. Literature Review 
There is an established literature on the asymmetric effects of increasing IPR protection on the North and 
the South. Early studies focus on the effects of IPR in reducing illegitimate imitation from the South and 
encouraging technology transfer from the North through licensing or foreign direct investment. In these 
studies, innovative activities are usually assumed to take place only in the North.6 However, two other 
important reasons for strengthening IPR in the South are (a) to provide incentives for the North to develop 
technologies that are also used by the South,7 and (b) to provide incentives for the South to invest in 
innovative activities. In a panel regression, Chen and Puttitanun (2005) find that strengthening IPR in 
developing countries has a positive and significant effect on their innovations.8 To fill in this gap in the 
literature, recent theoretical studies, such as Lai and Qiu (2003) and Grossman and Lai (2004), consider 
the other important role of TRIPS in providing sufficient incentives for innovation in both the North and 
the South. Our paper follows this branch of studies to focus on this aspect of TRIPS. 
Lai and Qiu (2003) and Grossman and Lai (2004) derive the Nash equilibrium level of patent 
protection in an open-economy variety-expanding model, in which the North and the South differ in 
innovative capability, and analyze the welfare effects of imposing the North’s level of patent protection 
                                                 
6 See, for example, Helpman (1993), Lai (1998), Yang and Maskus (2001) and Glass and Saggi (2002b). Glass and 
Saggi (2002a) consider two symmetric innovating countries.  
7 See, for example, Diwan and Rodrik (1991).  
8 Similarly, Falvey et al. (2006) find that strengthening IPR has a positive and significant effect on economic growth 
in low-income and high-income countries, but not in middle-income countries.  
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on the South. We complement these interesting studies by also considering the effects of TRIPS on 
income inequality and growth and by allowing for varying degree for the importance of foreign goods in 
domestic consumption. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to analyze the effects of 
TRIPS on welfare, growth and income inequality simultaneously. The allowance of varying degree of 
domestic importance of foreign goods also has interesting implications on global welfare.9  
Since the seminal study of Simon Kuznets (1955), the tradeoff between growth and inequality has 
become a very important issue in economics. On one hand, early theoretical and empirical studies tend to 
find a negative growth-inequality relationship.10  On the other hand, the more recent theoretical and 
empirical studies tend to find a positive growth-inequality relationship.11 Forbes (2000) argues that the 
different empirical results are due to omitted-variable bias and measurement error in previous studies. 
Garcia-Penalosa and Turnovsky (2006) argue that the theoretical relationship between growth and 
inequality should be ambiguous and depends on the underlying structural and policy changes. 
Incorporating wealth heterogeneity into an AK growth model, they show that a positive growth-inequality 
relationship is more likely to emerge than a negative one.12 
Although the capital-accumulation-driven growth models are useful frameworks for analyzing 
many macroeconomic issues, they are not suitable for evaluating innovation policies. Therefore, this 
study incorporates wealth heterogeneity into an open-economy quality-ladder model to analyze the effects 
of TRIPS. In a related study, Chu (2009) analyzes the effects of patent policy on growth and inequality in 
the US using a closed-economy quality-ladder model with wealth heterogeneity. The current study differs 
                                                 
9 Lai (2005) extends Grossman and Lai (2004) to consider the effects of trade barriers on the Nash equilibrium level 
of patent protection. Lai (2005) is interested in deriving a condition under which the level of patent protection is too 
low before TRIPS and finds that this condition is likely to holds based on calibrated parameters. In contrast, we are 
interested in the change in the level of global welfare before and after TRIPS. In other words, given a suboptimally 
low level of patent protection before TRIPS, we want to know whether the North is able to compensate the South 
under TRIPS, which is a very particular policy regime that requires the harmonization of patent protection. 
10 See, for example, Galor and Zeira (1993), Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Perotti 
(1996). 
11 See, for example, Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993), Benabou (1996), Galor and Tsiddon (1997), Li and Zou (1998) 
and Forbes (2000). Barro (2000) finds a positive (negative) relationship between growth and inequality in developed 
(developing) countries. 
12 See, also, Bertola (1993) for an early study on income distribution in the AK model and Caselli and Ventura 
(2000) for an interesting study that considers multiple dimensions of heterogeneity.  
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from Chu (2009) by (a) developing an open-economy model, (b) modeling the level of patent protection 
as the outcome of a policy game between countries, and (c) considering the effects of patent policy on 
welfare in addition to growth and inequality. There are other studies that also incorporate heterogeneity 
into R&D-growth models, such as Chou and Talmain (1996), Li (1998), Zweimuller (2000), Foellmi and 
Zweimuller (2006) and Bertola et al. (2006).13 However, these studies focus on the effects of inequality 
on growth but do not consider the effects of patent policy on income inequality. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 defines the 
equilibrium and analyzes its properties. Section 4 considers the effects of TRIPS on growth, welfare and 
income inequality. Section 5 concludes with some suggestions for future research. 
 
2. The Model 
The underlying quality-ladder model is similar to Grossman and Helpman (1991a). We modify the model 
by (a) extending it to a two-country setting with trade in intermediate inputs similar to Peng et al. (2006), 
(b) adding heterogeneity in the wealth of households, and (c) considering incomplete patent breadth (i.e. 
incomplete patent protection against imitation) as in Li (2001).14 There are two countries denoted by the 
North (n) and the South (s). As in Lai and Qiu (2003) and Grossman and Lai (2004), both countries invest 
in R&D, but the North is assumed to have a higher degree of innovative capability than the South. Also, 
trade is balanced as commonly assumed in the literature. 
Given that quality-ladder models have been well-studied, the familiar components of the models 
are briefly described in Sections 2.1-2.4. To conserve space, we only present the equations for the North. 
However, the readers are advised to keep in mind that for each equation that we present, there is an 
analogous equation for the South.  
                                                 
13 See, for example, Chu (2009) for a more detailed discussion on these studies. 
14 Lai and Qiu (2003) and Grossman and Lai (2004) consider patent protection in the form of patent length in their 
variety-expanding models. Given that we have a quality-ladder model, we consider patent protection in the form of 
patent breadth, which is an equally important patent-policy instrument commonly discussed in the patent-design 
literature. See, for example, O’Donoghue and Zweimuller (2004) for a discussion. Using China as an example, its 
statutory length of patent has been 20 years since 1993, and the patent-law amendments before its accession to the 
WTO in 2001 were related to other aspects of patent protection as mentioned in footnote 4. 
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 2.1. Households  
There is a continuum of identical households (except for the initial holding of wealth) on the unit interval 
]1,0[∈h  in each of the two countries indexed by a superscript },{ sn∈ , and households are immobile 
across countries. In country n, household h’s utility function is given by  
(1) ∫∞ −=
0
)(ln)( . dthCehU nt
tn ρ .15 
)(hCnt  denotes household h’s consumption. 0>ρ  is the exogenous discount rate. Each household 
maximizes utility subject to a sequence of budget constraints given by  
(2) )()()( hCPWhVRhV nt
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
t −+=& . 
)(hV nt  is the value of financial assets owned by household h in country n at time t. Household h’s share 
of financial assets at time 0 is exogenously given by nnnv VhVhs 000, /)()( ≡  that has a general distribution 
function with a mean of one and a standard deviation of nvσ  (i.e. the coefficient of variation of wealth). 
n
tR  is the nominal  rate of return on assets in country n. We assume home bias in asset holding such that 
the shares of monopolistic firms in each country are solely owned by domestic households.16 Household h 
inelastically supplies one unit of labor to earn a wage income ntW . 
n
tP  is the price of consumption in 
country n. From household h’s intertemporal optimization, the familiar Euler equation is given by 
(3) ρ−== ntn
t
n
t
n
t
n
t r
C
C
hC
hC &&
)(
)(
, 
where )(/)( hChC nt
n
t
&  is the same for all h and ntntntnt PPRr /&−≡  is the real rate of return on assets. 
 
                                                 
15 In a similar (closed-economy) model, Chu (2009) considers a more general iso-elastic utility function and shows 
that the positive relationship between growth and income inequality is robust to this specification change. To 
simplify the analytical derivation, we focus on the log utility function in this study. 
16 Note that home bias does not eliminate the positive externality of patent protection in generating profits to be 
earned by foreign households. When a country raises its level of patent protection, foreign firms owned by foreign 
households still earn a larger amount of profits. What home bias does is to naturally link the degree of this positive 
externality to the share of goods traded, which is determined by the domestic importance of foreign goods. 
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2.2. Final Goods  
Consumption in country n is an aggregate of domestic and foreign final goods given by  
(4) αα
αα
αα −
−
−= 1
,1,
)1(
)()( snt
nn
tn
t
CCC .17 
sn
tC
,  refers to final goods consumed by country n and produced by inputs from country s. The parameter 
]5.0,0[∈α  determines the importance of foreign goods in domestic consumption. A large number of 
perfectly competitive firms produce final goods using a standard Cobb-Douglas aggregator over a 
continuum of differentiated intermediates goods ]1,0[∈i . 
(5) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= ∫1
0
,, )(lnexp diiCC nnt
nn
t , 
(6) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= ∫1
0
,, )(lnexp diiCC snt
sn
t . 
)(, iC snt  refers to intermediate goods i produced by inputs from country s.  
  
 2.3. Intermediate Goods 
In country n, there is a continuum of industries indexed by ]1,0[∈i . Each industry is dominated by a 
temporary monopolistic leader, who produces )(, iX nnt  and )(
, iX nst  that are the necessary inputs for 
)(, iC nnt  and )(
, iC nst  respectively. The leader holds a patent in each country on the industry’s latest 
technology. Using the leader’s input )(, iX nnt , the level of output for )(
, iC nnt  is   
(7) )()( ,)(, iXziC nnt
iNnn
t
n
t= . 
1>z  is the exogenous quality improvement from each invention, and )(iN nt  is the number of inventions 
that have occurred in industry i of country n as of time t. In other words, )(iN
n
tz  represents the quality of 
                                                 
17 This type of Armington aggregator is commonly used in open-economy macroeconomic models for aggregating 
tradable goods across countries. See, for example, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000).  
 - 9 -
each unit of input produced by the leader while )(, iX nnt  is the quantity of input produced. Similarly, 
using the leader’s input )(, iX nst , the level of output for )(
, iC nst  is   
(8) )()1()( ,)(, iXziC nst
iNns
t
n
tτ−= , 
where )1,0[∈τ  is transportation costs (i.e. the fraction of goods lost or damaged during transportation 
from one country to another) capturing trade barriers.  
 To produce one unit of )(, iX nnt  or )(
, iX nst , the industry leader needs to employ one unit of 
workers. Therefore, the production function is  
(9) )()()()()( ,
,
,
,
,
,, iLiLiLiXiX n tx
ns
tx
nn
tx
ns
t
nn
t =+=+ . 
)(, iL
n
tx  is the number of workers in industry i of country n. The marginal cost of producing one unit of 
)(, iX nnt  or )(
, iX nst  is 
(10) nt
n
t WiMC =)( . 
Implicitly, we have assumed that the industry leader must employ domestic workers to produce for both 
domestic and foreign markets and abstracted from the issues of foreign direct investment, licensing and 
overseas imitation in order to keep the model tractable.18  
As commonly assumed in quality-ladder models, the current and former industry leaders engage 
in Bertrand competition, and the familiar profit-maximizing price for the current industry leader is a 
constant markup over the marginal cost. The prices for )(, iX nnt  and )(
, iX nst  are respectively 
(11) )(),()(, iMCbziP nt
nnn
t μ= , 
(12) )(),()(, iMCbziP nt
sns
t μ= , 
                                                 
18 These interesting issues have been well-studied in another strand of literature. See, for example, Grossman and 
Helpman (1991b), Helpman (1993), Lai (1998), Yang and Maskus (2001), Glass and Saggi (2002a, b) and Tanaka et 
al. (2007). 
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where bzbz =),(μ  for ]1,0(∈b . nb  ( sb ) captures the level of patent breadth in country n (s). In 
Grossman and Helpman (1991a), there is complete patent protection against imitation (i.e. 1=b ). Li 
(2001) generalizes the policy environment to capture incomplete patent protection against imitation (i.e. 
]1,0(∈b ). Because of incomplete patent protection, the former leader can imitate the current leader such 
that the quality of her product to be sold in country n (s) increases by a factor of 
nbz −1  (
sbz −1 ). In other 
words, the quality of the former leader’s product to be sold in country n (s) can increase to 
nn
t biNz −)(  
(
sn
t biNz −)( ) without infringing the current leader’s patents.19 As a result, the limit-pricing markup for the 
current leader is given by 
nbz  in country n and 
sbz  in country s respectively. An increase in b  in either 
country enables the current leader to charge a higher markup in that country. The resulting increases in 
monopolistic profits and the value of an invention improve the incentives for R&D. From now on, we 
denote patent protection as ),( nn bzμμ ≡  for convenience and consider changes in nμ  coming from 
changes in nb  only. 
  
 2.4. R&D 
Denote the expected value of an invention for industry i in country n as )(~ iV nt . Due to the Cobb-Douglas 
specification in (5) and (6), the amount of monopolistic profits is the same across industries within a 
country (i.e. nnt
nn
t i
,, )( ππ =  and nstnst i ,, )( ππ =  for ]1,0[∈i ). As a result, ntnt ViV ~)(~ =  for ]1,0[∈i . Also, 
denote the sum of profits generated by an invention from country n as nst
nn
t
n
t
,, πππ +≡ . Because of 
complete home bias in asset holding, the market value of inventions in country n equals the total value of 
assets owned by domestic households (i.e. nt
n
t VV =~ ). The familiar no-arbitrage condition for ntV  is  
(13) nt
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
t VVVR λπ −+= & . 
                                                 
19 ))(( 11 bNbN zzz −−− = , in which the first term on the right is the quality of the former leader’s product while the 
second term is the increase in the quality of her product by legally imitating the current leader’s product.  
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The left-hand side of (13) is the nominal return on this asset. The right-hand side of (13) consists of the 
sum of (a) the monopolistic profit ntπ  generated by this asset, (b) the potential capital gain ntV& , and (c) 
the expected capital loss nt
n
tVλ  due to creative destruction, in which ntλ  is the Poisson arrival rate of 
inventions in country n.  
 There is a continuum of R&D entrepreneurs indexed by ]1,0[∈j  in each country, and they hire 
workers to create inventions. The expected profit for entrepreneur j in country n is 
(14) )()()( ,, jLWjVj
n
tr
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
tr −= λπ . 
The Poisson arrival rate of inventions for entrepreneur j in country n is )()( , jLj
n
tr
nn
t ϕλ = , where nϕ  
captures the productivity of R&D workers in country n. Without loss of generality, we assume that 
sn ϕϕ ≥ . Because of free entry, the zero-profit condition from the R&D sector is given by  
(15) nt
nn
t WV =ϕ . 
This condition determines the allocation of labor between production and R&D within each country.  
 
3. Decentralized Equilibrium 
In this section, we define the equilibrium and show that the aggregate economy is always on a unique and 
stable balanced-growth path. Then, Section 3.1 shows that the distribution of assets is stationary on the 
balanced-growth path. Section 3.2 derives our measure of income inequality. Section 3.3 defines social 
welfare and characterizes the Nash equilibrium as well as the globally optimal level of patent protection. 
The equilibrium in country n is a sequence of prices ∞=0
,, }),(),(),(,,,{ t
n
t
n
t
ns
t
nn
t
n
t
n
t
n
t VhViPiPPWR  
and a sequence of allocations ∞=0
,,
,,
,,,, },,),(),(),(),(),(),(),({ t
sn
t
nn
t
n
t
n
t
n
tr
n
tx
ns
t
nn
t
ns
t
nn
t CCChCjLiLiXiXiCiC . 
Also, in each period,  
a. household h  chooses )}({ hCnt  to maximize (1) subject to (2) taking },,{
n
t
n
t
n
t PWR  as given;  
b. perfectly competitive final-goods firms maximize profit taking prices as given; 
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c. the leader in industry i  produces )}(),({ ,, iXiX nst
nn
t  and chooses )}(),(),({ ,
,, iLiPiP n tx
ns
t
nn
t  to 
maximize profit according to the Bertrand competition and taking }{ ntW  as given; 
d. R&D entrepreneur j  chooses )}({ , jL
n
tr  to maximize profit taking },{
n
t
n
t VW  as given;  
e. the market for consumption clears such that αα
αα
αα −
−
−==∫ 1
,1,1
0 )1(
)()()(
sn
t
nn
tn
t
n
t
CCCdhhC ; 
f. the market for domestic final goods clears such that ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= ∫1
0
,, )(lnexp diiCC nnt
nn
t ; 
g. the market for foreign final goods clears such that ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= ∫1
0
,, )(lnexp diiCC snt
sn
t ; 
h. the domestic market for intermediate goods i clears, i.e. )()( ,)(, iXziC nnt
iNnn
t
n
t= ; 
i. the overseas market for intermediate goods i clears, i.e. )()1()( ,)(, iXziC nst
iNns
t
n
tτ−= ; 
j. the labor market clears such that 1)()(
1
0
,
1
0
, =+ ∫∫ djjLdiiL n trn tx ; and 
k. the value of trade in intermediate goods is balanced such that nst
ns
t
sn
t
sn
t CPCP
,,,, = .20 
 
Lemma 1 shows that the aggregate economy always jumps immediately to a unique and stable 
balanced-growth path,21 in which all aggregate variables grow at some constant (possibly zero) rates. 
 
Lemma 1: The aggregate economy is always on a unique and stable balanced-growth path, in which the 
equilibrium allocation of labor in country n is given by  
                                                 
20 These price indices will be defined in the proof of Lemma 1. 
21 As in Grossman and Helpman (1991a), the implicit assumptions behind this result are (a) at any point in time, 
each industry has an existing leader with a competitor one step down the quality ladder and (b) R&D entrepreneurs 
always implement their inventions immediately (i.e. ruling out endogenous implementation cycles). 
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(16) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −=
−− nn
nnnn
xL ϕ
ρ
μ
αϕμ 11),(, , 
(17) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
−− ns
nsns
xL ϕ
ρ
μ
αϕμ 1),(, , 
(18) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−−=
+++ nsn
nsnn
rL ϕ
ρ
μ
α
μ
αϕμμ 111),,( . 
Proof: See Appendix A.■  
 
The properties of the equilibrium labor allocation are quite intuitive. An increase in nμ , sμ  or nϕ  
improves the incentives for R&D. As a result, labor is reallocated away from the production sector to the 
R&D sector. To ensure that 0>nrL , we impose a lower bound on R&D productivity.  
Condition R (R&D productivity): )1/( −Γ> nn ρϕ , 
where 
1
1
−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−≡Γ snn μ
α
μ
α
.  
 Given the equilibrium allocation of labor, the next lemma characterizes the equilibrium outcomes 
for the other aggregate variables. 
 
Lemma 2: On the balanced-growth path, the other aggregate variables are given by  
(19) nr
nnsnn Lϕϕμμλ =
+++
),,( , 
(20) zg
C
C snsnsnn
n
t
n
t ln])1[(),,,( .λαλαϕϕμμ +−=≡
++++
&
, 
(21) n
t
n
t
n
n
t P
WC ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ += ϕ
ρ1 . 
Proof: See Appendix A.■  
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The arrival rate of inventions is increasing in domestic R&D. The growth rate of consumption in country 
n is an increasing function in the arrival rate of inventions in either country. Thus, an increase in nμ , sμ , 
nϕ  or sϕ  increases domestic and/or foreign R&D as well as the consumption growth rate.  
 
3.1. Distribution of Assets 
I adopt a similar approach as in Garcia-Penalosa and Turnovsky (2006) to show that the distribution of 
assets is stationary on the balanced growth path. The value of assets in country n evolves according to  
(22) nt
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
t CPWVRV −+=& . 
Combining (2) and (22), the law of motion for tttv VhVhs /)()(, ≡  is given by  
(23) n
t
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
tv
n
tv
V
CPW
hV
hCPW
hs
hs −−−=
)(
)(
)(
)(
,
,& . 
From (15) and (21), )(, hs
n
tv  evolves according to a simple linear differential equation given by  
(24) nn
n
c
n
tv
n
tv hshshs ϕϕ
ρρ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−+= 1)(1)()( ,, .& . 
(24) describes the potential evolution of )(, hs
n
tv  given an initial value of )(0, hs
n
v . 
n
t
n
t
n
c ChChs /)()( ≡  is a 
stationary variable from (3), so that the last term in (24) is constant. The coefficient on )(, hs
n
tv  given by 
ρ  is constant and positive. Therefore, the only solution consistent with long-run stability is 0)(, =hsn tv&  
for all t. From (24), 0)(, =hsn tv&  for all t implies that )()( 0,, hshs nvn tv =  and 
(25) n
t
n
t
n
n
vn
t P
WhshC ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ += ϕ
ρ )(
1)( 0,
.
 
for all t. Lemma 3 summarizes the stationarity of the wealth distribution in country n. 
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Lemma 3: For every household h in country n, )()( 0,, hshs
n
v
n
tv =  for all t.   
Proof: Proven in the text.■  
 
3.2. Income Inequality 
This section derives our measure of income inequality. We consider inequality in real income that is the 
appropriate measure because it is invariant to the unit of denomination. Real income for household h is 
the sum of the real return on financial assets and the real wage rate given by  
(26) nt
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
t PWPhVrPhY //)(/)( += . 
From (3), (15) and Lemma 3, the share of real income earned by household h simplifies to  
(27) nn
nn
v
n
n
t
n
tn
ty g
hsg
Y
hYhs ϕρ
ϕρ
++
++=≡ )()()()( 0,,  
for all t. The standard deviation of income share (i.e. the coefficient of variation of income) is   
(28) nvnn
n
n
ty
n
y g
gdhhs σϕρ
ρσ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
++
+=−≡ ∫1
0
2
, ]1)([ , 
where the coefficient of variation of wealth nvσ  is exogenously given at time 0.22 We follow Garcia-
Penalosa and Turnovsky (2006) to use the coefficient of variation of income as a measure of income 
inequality. Proposition 1 summarizes the effect of growth on income inequality. 
 
Proposition 1: Holding ρ , nϕ  and nvσ  constant, income inequality is increasing in the growth rate. 
Proof: See (28).■ 
 
                                                 
22 (28) shows an interesting difference between the AK model and the quality-ladder model. The AK model in 
Garcia-Penalosa and Turnovsky (2006) relies on elastic labor supply to generate an endogenous income distribution 
while the quality-ladder model generates an endogenous income distribution even with inelastic labor supply. See, 
for example, Chu (2009) for a quality-ladder model with heterogeneous households and elastic labor supply.  
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Intuitively, a higher growth rate drives up the real interest rate through the Euler equation, and the 
resulting higher return on assets increases the income share )(hsy  of asset-wealthy households (i.e. 
1)( >hsv ) while it decreases that of asset-poor households (i.e. 1)( <hsv ). This positive relationship 
between growth and inequality is consistent with recent empirical studies, such as Li and Zou (1998) and 
Forbes (2000), as discussed in Section 1.1. We now consider the effects of an exogenous increase in 
patent protection on growth and income inequality. Corollary 1 shows that a higher level of patent 
protection in either country increases R&D and hence economic growth as well as income inequality in 
both countries. 
 
Corollary 1: An increase in nμ  or sμ  increases growth and income inequality in both countries.  
Proof: See (20) and (28).■ 
 
3.3. Social Welfare 
Due to the balanced-growth behavior of the model, the utility of household h in country n simplifies to  
(29) 2
0 )(ln)( ρρ
nn
n ghChU += .  
Substituting (25) into (29) yields 
(30) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ += ρϕ
ρ
ρ
n
n
n
n
n
vn g
P
WhshU
0
00, ln
)(
1ln1)(
.
. . 
The lifetime utility of a household depends on the growth rate and the level of initial consumption, which 
in turn depends on the real wage rate and the share of assets owned by the household. Although the 
ownership of assets varies across households, (30) shows that this household-specific term is independent 
of patent protection. This property is a result of the log utility function, and this convenient feature allows 
us to abstract from choosing a social welfare function for the government.  
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Lemma 4: After dropping the exogenous terms, the real wage rate in country n can be decomposed into 
(31) )/ln()1ln(ln)/ln( 00
snnnn WWPW αταμ +−+−= . 
Proof: See Appendix A.■ 
 
Lemma 4 shows that the real wage rate in country n has three components (a) the negative effect 
of markup pricing, (b) the negative effect of trade barriers,23 and (c) the relative wage rate across the two 
countries. An expression for the relative wage rate can be derived using the balanced-trade condition 
sn
t
sn
t
ns
t
ns
t CPCP
,,,, = , which simplifies to  
(32) 11/1),( ,
,
≥⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
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⎛=≡
−+ nsnsx
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n
L
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W
ϕ
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ϕ
ρ
μ
μϕϕω . 
Therefore, the relative wage rate is independent of patent protection and depends on the relative R&D 
productivity between the North and the South. Substituting (31) and (32) into (30) and dropping the terms 
that are independent of patent protection yield the welfare of any household h in country n as a function 
of nμ  and sμ  given by  
(33) ρ
μμμμμ ),(ln),(
snn
nsnn g+−≡Ω . 
(33) has two interesting features. Firstly, the welfare component that depends on patent protection is the 
same across households. Secondly, (33) captures the tradeoff between static costs nμln−  and dynamic 
benefits ρ/ng  from raising patent protection that was firstly studied by Nordhaus (1969). 
Upon deriving the welfare function, we firstly characterize the Nash equilibrium level of patent 
protection in the two countries denoted by ),( sNE
n
NE μμ . As in Grossman and Lai (2004), the policymaker 
in each country chooses the domestic level of patent protection once and for all at time 0 to maximize 
domestic households’ welfare (33) taking the foreign level of patent protection as given. In other words, 
                                                 
23 For example, the benefit of China’s accession to the WTO may be captured by a reduction in trade barriers that 
increases social welfare in China. 
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the policymakers in the two countries play a one-shot game at time 0. Also, we assume an interior 
solution for the equilibrium level of patent protection such that z<μ  (i.e. 1<b ) in each country. 
 
Proposition 2: The Nash equilibrium level of patent protection is given by  
(34) z
sn
snn
NE ln11)1(),(
22 ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
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⎛ +−=
++ ρ
ϕαρ
ϕαϕϕμ , 
(35) z
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NE ln11)1(),(
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⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ++⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−=
++ ρ
ϕαρ
ϕαϕϕμ . 
Proof: See Appendix A.■ 
 
As in Lai and Qiu (2003) and Grossman and Lai (2004), we find that the Nash equilibrium level 
of patent protection is stronger in the North than in the South unless either (a) 5.0=α  or (b) sn ϕϕ = . 
For the rest of the analysis, we assume that neither (a) nor (b) hold such that sNE
n
NE μμ > . Next, we derive 
the globally optimal level of patent protection denoted by )max(arg),( snsGO
n
GO Ω+Ω≡μμ .24 If 0=α , 
then nGO
n
NE μμ =  and sGOsNE μμ = . Otherwise, nGOnNE μμ <  and sGOsNE μμ <  (i.e. a suboptimally low level 
of patent protection in the Nash equilibrium). For the rest of the analysis, we assume that 0>α .  
 
Proposition 3: The globally optimal level of patent protection is given by  
(36) nNE
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Proof: See Appendix A.■ 
                                                 
24 To be consistent with previous studies, we use this utilitarian approach to define global welfare.  
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Furthermore, Corollary 2 shows that the positive externality in the Nash equilibrium is increasing in the 
domestic importance of foreign goods such that the Nash equilibrium level of patent protection deviates 
further away from the globally optimal level as α  increases. 
 
Corollary 2: An increase in α increases nNEnGO μμ −  and sNEsGO μμ − . 
Proof: See Appendix A.■ 
 
4. Effects of TRIPS 
In this section, we analyze the effects of TRIPS on growth, welfare and income inequality simultaneously. 
We follow Lai and Qiu (2003) to define the policy regime under TRIPS as nNE
n
TRIPS
s
TRIPS μμμ == . Under 
TRIPS, the North experiences higher levels of growth and welfare at the expense of higher income 
inequality. As for the South, it experiences higher growth at the expense of lower welfare and higher 
income inequality.  
Under TRIPS, the South’s level of patent protection increases from sNEμ  to sTRIPSμ . This higher 
level of patent protection increases growth in both countries (i.e. nNE
n
TRIPS gg >  and sNEsTRIPS gg > ). (28) 
shows that higher growth increases income inequality (i.e. n NEy
n
TRIPSy ,, σσ >  and s NEys TRIPSy ,, σσ > ). Also, 
(33) shows that the higher growth in the North unambiguously increases its welfare (i.e. nNE
n
TRIPS Ω>Ω ). 
As for the South, the increase in sμ  leads to two opposing effects on its welfare. One is the positive 
growth effect, and the other is the negative effect of markup pricing. However, from the definition of the 
Nash equilibrium, a unilateral deviation from the best response must render the South worse off (i.e. 
s
NE
s
TRIPS Ω<Ω ). Proposition 4 summarizes these findings.  
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Proposition 4: In the North, the effects of TRIPS on growth, welfare and income inequality are (a) 
n
NE
n
TRIPS gg > , (b) nNEnTRIPS Ω>Ω , and (c) n NEyn TRIPSy ,, σσ > . In the South, the effects of TRIPS on growth, 
welfare and income inequality are (a) sNE
s
TRIPS gg > , (b) sNEsTRIPS Ω<Ω , and (c) s NEys TRIPSy ,, σσ > . 
Proof: Proven in the text.■ 
 
Finally, we compare the level of global welfare between the Nash equilibrium and the policy 
regime under TRIPS. It turns out that there exists a critical degree for the importance of foreign goods in 
domestic consumption below which global welfare is lower under TRIPS. Proposition 5 summarizes this 
result, and Figure 1 plots )()( sNE
n
NE
s
TRIPS
n
TRIPS Ω+Ω−Ω+Ω≡ΔΩ  against α . 
 
Proposition 5: There exists a cutoff value )5.0,0(∈α  such that (a) sNEnNEsTRIPSnTRIPS Ω+Ω<Ω+Ω  if 
),0( αα ∈ , and (b) sNEnNEsTRIPSnTRIPS Ω+Ω>Ω+Ω  if )5.0,(αα ∈ . 
Proof: See Appendix A.■ 
 
 
Firstly, note that as →α 0, sNEnNEsTRIPSnTRIPS Ω+Ω<Ω+Ω  because the two economies are in autarky and 
the South’s optimal level of patent protection is lower than that of the North. Forcing the South to adopt 
the North’s level of patent protection causes the South to experience a welfare loss while the North’s 
welfare is unchanged. When α  is slightly above 0, )()( sNEnNEsTRIPSnTRIPS Ω+Ω−Ω+Ω  is increasing in α  
Figure 1: Difference in Global Welfare between TRIPS and the Nash Equilibrium 
α  
0.5
0 α
ΔΩ  
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because the positive externality in the Nash equilibrium reduces the welfare loss in the South and leads to 
a small welfare gain for the North under TRIPS. As →α 0.5, sNEnNEsTRIPSnTRIPS Ω+Ω=Ω+Ω  because the 
Nash equilibrium is the same as the policy regime under TRIPS, such that sTRIPS
s
NE μμ = . When α  is 
slightly less than 0.5, sNE
n
NE
s
TRIPS
n
TRIPS Ω+Ω>Ω+Ω  because sGOsTRIPSsNE μμμ << . In other words, the 
South’s level of patent protection under TRIPS is moving towards the globally optimal level. For 
intermediate values of α , there exists a critical degree α  below (above) which global welfare under 
TRIPS is lower (higher) than in the Nash equilibrium.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper analyzes the effects of TRIPS on growth, welfare and income inequality simultaneously. In 
summary, strengthening patent protection in developing countries as a result of TRIPS increases global 
economic growth but also worsens global income inequality. Whether it increases global welfare depends 
on the importance of foreign goods in domestic consumption. To derive these results, this paper 
incorporates heterogeneity in the wealth of households into an open-economy quality-ladder model. Our 
model belongs to the class of first-generation R&D-growth models that may exhibit scale effects, in 
which a larger economy experiences faster growth and an economy with growing population experiences 
an increasing growth rate rather than a balanced-growth path. We avoid these problems by normalizing 
each country’s population size to one.25 A possible direction for future research is to analyze the effects of 
TRIPS on growth and income inequality in later vintages of R&D-growth models.  
In our model, we have abstracted from some interesting issues, such as licensing, foreign direct 
investment, and North-South product cycles. In reality, both of (a) technology transfer from the North to 
                                                 
25 The literature has two other ways of dealing with scale effects (a) the semi-endogenous growth model and (b) the 
second-generation endogenous-growth model that combines quality improvement and variety expansion. On one 
hand, Jones (1999) and Li (2000) provide theoretical support for the semi-endogenous growth model by showing 
that the second-generation model consists of two knife-edge parameter conditions. On the other hand, a number of 
empirical studies, such as Laincz and Peretto (2006) and Madsen (2008), provide empirical support for the second-
generation model. Our model’s implication that devoting a larger share of labor to R&D would increase growth is 
consistent with the second-generation model; see, for example, Jones (1999). 
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the South and (b) providing sufficient incentives for the South to innovate are important reasons for 
strengthening IPR in the South. For analytical tractability and the relative lack of attention to the latter 
issue in the literature, we have decided to focus on (b) instead of (a). Therefore, another possible direction 
for future research is to account for these issues in a model with heterogeneous households. Furthermore, 
the enforcement of IPR is as important as the statutory law in the real world, and hence, it is interesting 
for future studies to also take into consideration the issue of IPR enforcement in developing countries. 
Finally, although our model is designed to analyze the positive externality associated with IPR 
protection provided by developed and developing countries, the two countries in the model can easily be 
relabeled as two developed countries by assuming that they have similar levels of R&D productivity. In 
this case, the Nash equilibrium level of patent protection continues to be lower than the globally optimal 
level as long as α  is greater than zero. In other words, a coordination failure of patent policy can exist 
even among developed countries suggesting the importance of also evaluating whether the level of IPR 
protection chosen by developed countries is indeed optimal from the perspective of global welfare. 
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Appendix A 
Proof of Lemma 1: In this proof, we first show that aggregate expenditure on consumption nt
n
t
n
t CPE ≡  
in country n always jumps immediately to a unique and stable steady-state value. Then, we show that this 
steady-state value determines a unique and stationary equilibrium allocation of labor in country n. 
Choosing labor as the numeraire in country n (i.e. 1=ntW  for all t) implies that 1=nntV ϕ  for all t from 
(15). Given that nϕ  is constant, 0=ntV& . Integrating (2) over ]1,0[∈h  and then setting ntV&  to zero yield  
(A1) nnt
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
t RVRWE ϕ/1+=+= . 
Using its definition, the law of motion for aggregate expenditure on consumption is given by  
(A2) ρ−=+= ntn
t
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
t R
C
C
P
P
E
E &&&
 
from (3) because )(/)(/ hChCCC nt
n
t
n
t
n
t
&& =  for all ]1,0[∈h . Substituting (A1) into (A2) yields 
(A3) ρϕ −−= )1(/ ntnntnt EEE& , 
which is plotted in Figure 2. 
 
For any initial value of ntE  below 
nϕρ /1+ , ntE  eventually converges to zero violating the households’ 
utility maximization. For any initial value of ntE  above 
nϕρ /1+ , ntE  eventually increases to a point in 
which all the workers are allocated to production. A zero allocation of R&D workers violates the R&D 
n
tE  
n
tE&  
nϕ
ρ+1
0 
Figure 2 Phase Diagram 
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entrepreneurs’ profit maximization. Therefore, to be consistent with long-run stability, ntE  must always 
jump to its unique non-zero steady state given by 
(A4) nnE ϕρ /1+= . 
From (A2), 0=ntE&  implies that ρ=ntR  for all t. 
Next, we derive the equilibrium allocation of labor. The price index for αα
αα
αα −
−
−= 1
,1,
)1(
)()( snt
nn
tn
t
CCC  
is αα )()( ,1, snt
nn
t
n
t PPP
−≡ . The price index for nntC ,  is n
t
n
t
n
iN
nn
tnn
t Z
Wdi
z
iPP n
t
μ=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛≡ ∫1
0
)(
,
, )(lnexp  , where 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛≡ ∫ zdiiNZ ntnt ln)(exp 1
0
. Similarly, the price index for sntC
,  is s
t
s
t
n
sn
t Z
WP
)1(
,
τ
μ
−= . From (5), (7) and (9), 
the aggregate production function for nn tx
n
t
nn
t LZC
,
,
, = . Similarly, from (6), (8) and (9), the aggregate 
production function for sn tx
s
t
sn
t LZC
,
,
, )1( τ−= . For country n, the value of export is nstnst CP ,,  while the 
value of import is snt
sn
t CP
,, . The balanced-trade condition is  
(A5) sn txn
t
s
n
ns
tx
sn
t
sn
t
ns
t
ns
t LLCPCP
,
,
,
,
,,,, ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=⇔= ωμ
μ
,  
where st
n
t
n
t WW /≡ω  denotes the relative wage rate. The conditional demand functions in country n for 
domestic and foreign final goods are nt
n
t
nn
t
nn
t CPCP )1(
,, α−=  and ntntsntsnt CPCP .,, α= . Combining these 
two conditions yield 
(A6) nn tx
n
t
sn
tx
sn
t
sn
t
nn
t
nn
t LLCPCP ,,
,
,
,,,,
1)1(
ωα
α
αα ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−=⇔=− . 
Substituting (A6) into (A5) yields  
(A7) nn txs
n
ns
tx LL
,
,
,
, 1
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= α
α
μ
μ
.  
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Substituting )1/()1/( ,,
,, αμα −=−= nn txnnntnntnt LCPE  into (A4) yields (16). Then, substituting (16) into 
(A7) yields (17). Finally, substituting (16) and (17) into the labor-market clearing condition yields (18). A 
similar exercise yields the unique, stable and stationary equilibrium allocation of labor in country s.■ 
 
Proof of Lemma 2: The arrival rate of inventions in country n is  
(A8) n tr
nn
t L ,ϕλ = .  
The growth rate of ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= ∫∫ zdzdiiNZ t nntnt lnexpln)(exp
0
1
0
τλτ  is given by  
(A9) z
Z
Z n
tn
t
n
t lnλ=& .  
The balanced-growth rate of consumption in country n is  
(A10) zz
C
C sn
n
t
n
t lnln)1( .λαλα +−=& . 
Finally, aggregating (2) over ]1,0[∈h  yields the level of consumption in country n given by  
(A11) n
t
n
t
nn
t
n
t
n
t
n
tn
t P
W
P
VRWC ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +=+= ϕ
ρ1  
because 0=ntV& , ρ=ntR  and ntnnt WV =ϕ .■ 
 
Proof of Lemma 4: Firstly, normalize nW0  to one. Then, the price index for consumption at time 0 is 
αα )()( ,0
1,
00
snnnn PPP −≡ , where nnnnn ZWP 00,0 /μ=  and ])1/[( 00,0 ssnsn ZWP τμ −=  from the proof for 
Lemma 1. The initial levels of technology ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛≡ ∫ zdiiNZ nn ln)(exp 1
0
00  and ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛≡ ∫ zdiiNZ ss ln)(exp 1
0
00  are 
exogenous. After dropping the exogenous terms, )/ln( 00
nn PW  simplifies to (31).■ 
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Proof of Proposition 2: After dropping the terms that are independent of patent protection, the welfare of 
any household h in country n is  
(A12) ρμ
n
nn g+−=Ω ln . 
The arrival rates of inventions in the two countries are  
(A13) )(1 ρϕμ
α
μ
αϕλ +⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−−= nsnnn , 
(A14) )(1 ρϕμ
α
μ
αϕλ +⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−−= snsss . 
Substituting (A13) and (A14) into (A10) yields  
(A15) zg sns
sn
sn
nn ln)(1)(1)1( ⎟⎟⎠
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⎞
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⎛ +−−−= ρϕμ
α
μ
αϕαρϕμ
α
μ
αϕα . 
Substituting (A15) into (A12) and then dropping the exogenous terms yield 
(A16) ρρϕμ
α
μ
ααρϕμ
α
μ
ααμ zsnsnsnnn ln)(1)(1)1(ln ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
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⎞⎜⎜⎝
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Differentiating (A16) with respect to nμ  yields  
(A17) 0ln)()(11
22
=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +⎟⎟⎠
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Solving (A17) yields (34), and (35) can be obtained using a similar derivation.■  
 
Proof of Proposition 3: Combining (A16) and the analogous condition for country s yields  
(A18) ρρϕμ
α
μ
αρϕμ
α
μ
αμμ zsnsnsnsnsn ln)(1)(1lnln ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
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⎛ +−++⎟⎟⎠
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⎛ +−−−−=Ω+Ω . 
Differentiating (A18) with respect to nμ  yields  
 - 31 -
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Solving (A19) yields (36), and (37) can be obtained using a similar derivation.■ 
 
Proof of Corollary 2: Subtracting (34) from (36) and differentiating nNE
n
GO μμ −  with respect to α  show 
that the sign of αμμ ∂−∂ /)( nNEnGO  is given by the sign of 0)21( >− α  for 5.0<α . Similarly, from (35) 
and (37), differentiating sNE
s
GO μμ −  with α  shows that the sign of αμμ ∂−∂ /)( sNEsGO  is also given by 
α21− .■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 5: As →α 0, sNEnNEsTRIPSnTRIPS Ω+Ω<Ω+Ω  because the two countries are in 
autarky so that sTRIPS
s
GO μμ < . As →α 0.5, sNEnNEsTRIPSnTRIPS Ω+Ω=Ω+Ω  because the Nash equilibrium 
is the same as the policy regime under TRIPS such that sTRIPS
s
NE μμ = . The rest of the proof shows that 
there must exist an intermediate range of α , in which sNEnNEsTRIPSnTRIPS Ω+Ω>Ω+Ω . From (34) and (37), 
s
TRIPS
s
GO μμ −  is an increasing function in α . As →α 0.5, sTRIPSsGO μμ > . Therefore, there must exist a 
threshold denoted by )5.0,0(~∈α  above which sGOsTRIPSsNE μμμ << . When )5.0,~[αα ∈ , it is sufficient 
for sNE
n
NE
s
TRIPS
n
TRIPS Ω+Ω>Ω+Ω  to hold, and there exists a lower critical value )~,0( αα ∈  above which 
s
NE
n
NE
s
TRIPS
n
TRIPS Ω+Ω>Ω+Ω  still holds. In this case, the South’s level of patent protection moves from 
one suboptimal level to another suboptimal level (i.e. sTRIPS
s
GO
s
NE μμμ << ). In summary, for low values 
of α , sNEnNEsTRIPSnTRIPS Ω+Ω<Ω+Ω . As α  increases above α , the reverse is true.■ 
 
 
 
 
